Shanshan (pseudonym), a researcher at an institute, received this year’s labor union benefit—an outdoor polo shirt from AIGLE. Faced with this brand name that remains relatively low-profile in the public eye, she and her colleagues were momentarily puzzled, with some even jokingly speculating: ‘Is this brand clearing out inventory?’
Li-Ning’s Outdoor Ambitions: Early Moves and Current Challenges
AIGLE’s awkward positioning represents a microcosm of Li-Ning’s outdoor expansion difficulties. As a leading domestic sportswear brand, Li-Ning entered the outdoor market relatively early, taking over operations of the French outdoor leisure brand AIGLE back in 2005.
The Haglöfs Acquisition: A New Hope
In 2023, LionRock Capital, where Li-Ning serves as non-executive chairman, acquired Swedish century-old outdoor brand Haglöfs. By mid-2024, Haglöfs began establishing stores in multiple Chinese cities. Today, while Anta flourishes in the market with outdoor brands like Arc’teryx, Li-Ning’s two outdoor brands—one ‘lukewarm’ and the other just starting—seem to lack presence.
Comparative Analysis: Li-Ning vs. Anta Outdoor Strategies
Brand Portfolio and Market Positioning
Known as ‘matchstick’ among outdoor enthusiasts due to its ‘H’ shaped logo resembling a match, the Swedish century-old outdoor brand Haglöfs was fully acquired by private equity firm LionRock Capital in 2023. In June 2024, Hong Kong-listed company Frontier Services Group announced that its subsidiary Futuan Global and LionRock Capital established a joint venture with 50% ownership each, obtaining intellectual property license rights for Greater China.
Distribution and Retail Strategies
It’s worth noting that Frontier Services Group is controlled by Li-Ning and his brother Li Jin, with Li-Ning serving as board chairman, CEO, and ultimate beneficiary. He is also an LP (limited partner) of LionRock Capital-related funds, creating close interest connections among the three. The industry generally interprets this as a strategic move by the Li-Ning group in the outdoor sector.
Market Response and Consumer Perception
Regarding channel strategy, Haglöfs adopts a high-end boutique store model offline. According to incomplete statistics, Haglöfs’ Lhasa store has already opened, with stores preparing to open in Beijing, Shanghai, and other first-tier cities; Tianju, Changsha, Qingdao, Zhengzhou, and other new first-tier cities; as well as second-tier cities like Shijiazhuang and Harbin. Online, they’ve established Tmall and Xiaohongshu stores.
Brand Awareness and Social Media Presence
In terms of brand promotion, Haglöfs intentionally approaches young fashion crowds, announcing its entry into Xiaohongshu on February 15 this year. Since joining, in less than seven months, it has published 77 notes and gained over 6,000 followers. Here, Arc’teryx has garnered over 260,000 followers with likes and collections reaching 937,000.
The AIGLE Conundrum: Two Decades of Missed Opportunities
Product Pricing and Design Limitations
Looking at product pricing, except for backpacks under ¥1,000, Haglöfs’ outdoor pants and hard-shell jackets are priced between ¥1,000 and ¥7,500—significantly higher compared to the Swedish website’s 350-5,000 SEK (approximately ¥264-3,773). From this perspective, the Li-Ning family似乎也想借鉴安踏对始祖鸟的打法，把火柴棍包装成运动与奢侈结合的“运奢”品牌。
Market Position and Consumer Demographics
事实上，除了火柴棍，李宁手里也没有别的“牌”，能承担起李宁系“始祖鸟”的重任。至于艾高，这么多年，李宁从未单独披露过艾高的业绩，或可见体量袖珍。In terms of outdoor starting lines, Li-Ning actually started much earlier than Anta. In 2005, Li-Ning brought in the French century-old outdoor brand AIGLE originating from 1853; while Anta didn’t acquire Arc’teryx and Salomon’s parent company Amer Sports until 2019 at a price of €4.6 billion together with a private equity consortium.
Financial Performance and Strategic Imperatives
As the ‘veteran’ of Li-Ning’s outdoor layout, AIGLE has remained ‘unknown deep in the boudoir’ for 20 years. Or rather, compared to brands in the same price range, AIGLE hasn’t yet reached the mass market. Looking at Tmall flagship store follower counts, as of September 4, The North Face, Arc’teryx, Descente, and Kolon sport have reached 6.82 million, 3.11 million, 2.81 million, and 2.06 million followers respectively, while AIGLE only has 950,000. Compared to early 2025, AIGLE only gained 40,000 followers, while the aforementioned brands gained 250,000-350,000 each.
Revenue Trends and Competitive Pressure
From a product pricing perspective, AIGLE positions itself in the mid-to-high-end range, with down jackets selling for up to ¥8,000, and most jackets around ¥3,000. This price is slightly lower than Arc’teryx and Canada Goose but significantly higher than mass brands like Decathlon. In design, AIGLE leans towards a low-key ‘old money’ style, emphasizing functionality with some casual options, but overall lacks trendy and personalized elements that attract young consumers. An AIGLE store employee revealed: ‘Customers who come to shop are usually around 40 years old.’ Some young consumers trying on AIGLE’s冲锋衣 stated: ‘The style is too ordinary, even a bit outdated, and the price isn’t cheap either, so I won’t consider it.’
Can Li-Ning Succeed in Outdoor Markets? The Path Forward
Learning from Anta’s Multi-Brand Success
Among the four major domestic sportswear brands—Anta, Li-Ning, Xtep, and 361 Degrees—Xtep has made ‘running’ its deep moat; 361 Degrees broke through in lower-tier markets with ‘children + e-commerce’; only Anta has flourished in the outdoor business. On the surface, it似乎也可以不做户外。但从业绩上，李宁在四大品牌里或许是最该有危机感的。
Strategic Adjustments and Future Outlook
In 2023, Li-Ning Company’s revenue reached ¥27.6 billion, only increasing by 7% year-over-year, ranking last among the four major local brands—Anta, Xtep, and 361 Degrees all maintained double-digit growth momentum; that year’s net profit罕见倒退22%，缩水至32亿元，是唯一净利下滑的国产龙头。In 2024, Li-Ning achieved revenue of ¥28.676 billion, a year-over-year increase of 3.9%, with net profit of ¥3.013 billion, a decrease of 5.5% year-over-year. Although the decline narrowed compared to the previous year, it remained the one with the smallest growth and the only declining net profit among the ‘Big Four’ sportswear brands. By the first half of this year, the downward trend showed no signs of reversal. In the first half of 2025, Li-Ning’s net profit was ¥1.737 billion, a year-over-year decrease of 11%. Retail channel performance faced pressure, with direct store layout adjustments and consumption scene shifts leading to a 3.4% year-over-year decrease in revenue. This means over 40% of Li-Ning’s ‘fundamental base’ is contracting. Making matters worse, Li-Ning’s inventory piled up from ¥1.3 billion in 2021 to ¥2.43 billion in the first half of 2025, nearly doubling in three years. A series of data reflects an unavoidable fact—in recent years, Li-Ning’s development has encountered challenges again.
Key Challenges and Strategic Weaknesses
First is the weakening of core categories. In the first half of 2025, Li-Ning’s footwear sales saw some recovery, reaching ¥8.23 billion, but apparel product revenue was ¥5.193 billion, a year-over-year decrease of 3.4%, with its share of total revenue slightly decreasing to 35%. According to National Bureau of Statistics data, from January to June 2025, China’s retail sales of clothing, shoes, hats, and knitwear reached ¥742.6 billion, a year-over-year increase of 3.1%. Among them, the single-month growth rate in June slowed to 1.9%, hitting a new low for the year. Therefore, even if Li-Ning pushes products to the extreme, it ultimately cannot avoid the cold wind of the general trend. To counter this, Li-Ning has continuously been ‘adding categories’—outdoor, women’s, youth, trendy Chinese ‘China Li-Ning’, and轻奢线 ‘LI-NING1990’. However, each赛道都有更锋利的对手：户外有亚玛芬、迪桑特；女子有lululemon等。When Camel sells ¥399冲锋衣 as number one nationwide, 361 Degrees thrives in lower-tier markets, and On and HOKA make running a middle-class lifestyle, Li-Ning’s ‘single brand, multiple categories’ strategy appears broad yet scattered: doing everything but struggling to be top-of-mind for consumers.
Li-Ning’s Outdoor Future: Possibilities and Limitations
Li-Ning isn’t unaware of this. From the latest financial report, it’s clear that Li-Ning is advancing by retreating—on one hand, streamlining channels and optimizing store structure by net closing 51 stores; on the other hand, reducing reliance on国潮traffic while boosting professional sports. Additionally, through family出面引入国际品牌，为多品牌探索留余地。Although Li-Ning officially repeatedly denies ‘moving closer to Anta’s multi-brand model’, every move on the Frontier Services Group and LionRock Capital joint venture chessboard is held by the Li-Ning family; the接连亮起的火柴棍门店围挡 in Shanghai’s Huaihai Road, Beijing’s China World Mall, and Tianjin’s MixC have already brought this ‘unofficial’ high-end outdoor暗战 to the forefront. Li-Ning wanting a share of the outdoor market is understandable, but is it too late to enter now? After years of development, Arc’teryx’s full-year revenue in 2024 already exceeded $2 billion, becoming the fastest-growing and largest brand within the Amer Sports Group. Clearly, the赛道是好赛道。But有趣的是，2025年二季度，始祖鸟所在部门增速已有所下滑。初来乍到的“火柴棍”，还能赶上这场“大集”，喝上口热汤吗？Whether it can have a taste of success or not, Li-Ning needs to try. Because the outdoor赛道对李宁而言，绝非简单的 ‘追风口’—it is both a key leverage point to reverse the growth decline and an essential path to弥补单品牌战略短板、实现二次增长。Regarding whether ‘matchstick’ can replicate Arc’teryx’s success, camping season founder and decade-long outdoor enthusiast Lao Zhao’s answer is: ‘Impossible, because there’s only one Arc’teryx.’ The gap between the two can be clearly seen from three core dimensions: brand awareness, product strength, and operational capability. From a brand awareness perspective, ‘Canada’s Arc’teryx, Switzerland’s Mammut, America’s Marmot’ circulates widely as a rhyme in outdoor circles. While ‘matchstick’ has a century-old Swedish history, it far from enters the first tier, following ‘Marmot, Arc’teryx, Mammut’. Even brands supported by Sanfo Outdoor like Klättermusen and Houdini have louder voices than ‘matchstick’. Lao Zhao stated: ‘Weak recognition is its biggest shortcoming.’ ‘Looking at product strength, Arc’teryx’s Alpha, Beta, Gamma series have long established reputation with excellent functionality and materials, becoming benchmarks in细分领域; but ‘matchstick’ lacks star products that players remember—even veteran players might not name two or three of its representative works,’ Lao Zhao believes. ‘Matchstick’ currently remains at the ‘durable and sturdy’ pure outdoor product mindset. More crucially, ‘matchstick’s product sizing optimization for Chinese consumers’ body types remains insufficient. On social media, ‘narrow size range’ and ‘too slim and long’ are common evaluations. Finally, regarding operational capability, Lao Zhao believes that Anta’s success in operating Arc’teryx本质上源于多年多品牌经验的积累：through operating Fila, Descente, and Kolon, it not only figured out the positioning logic of ‘outdoor轻奢’ but also cultivated a group of professional operators. Simultaneously, it possesses sufficient control over经销商线下渠道 and online price control capabilities against overseas shopping and代购. In contrast, Li-Ning, with sluggish performance growth and stock prices falling 70-80%, faces the ultimate test of how to turn outdoor brands with ‘century-old history’ and ‘professional基因’ into ‘worth buying’ in consumers’ eyes—a challenge involving strategic positioning, brand operation, and channel control.