Chinese Online Lending in India: A $5 Billion Lesson in Cross-Border Fintech Failure

6 mins read
December 18, 2025

Executive Summary: Key Insights from the Indian Lending Debacle

– Chinese online lending companies expanded aggressively into India after domestic crackdowns, targeting a market with low banking penetration and high demand for credit.
– Initial profitability from sky-high interest rates was illusionary, as lenders faced catastrophic bad debt rates of 47% to 80%, far exceeding levels in China.
– Cultural mismatches, including widespread loan fraud and language barriers, crippled collection efforts and exacerbated financial losses.
– Indian regulators launched a sustained crackdown, leading to app removals, asset seizures, and arrests, forcing a mass exit of lenders.
– This case serves as a critical warning for fintech investors about the risks of cross-border expansion without deep local market intelligence and regulatory compliance.

The Allure of India: A Perfect Storm for Online Lending

In 2019, as Chinese authorities intensified their crackdown on predatory high-interest short-term loans, known domestically as 714高炮 (714 gāopào), hundreds of online lending firms faced existential threats. With regulatory doors slamming shut at home, these companies urgently sought new frontiers, and their collective gaze settled on India. This marked the beginning of a massive, and ultimately disastrous, foray into Chinese online lending in India. The subcontinent appeared to be a lender’s paradise: a nation of over 1.3 billion people with a digital boom but critically underbanked population.

India’s market fundamentals were irresistibly compelling. With approximately 500 million smartphone users, formal banking financial coverage below 50%, and credit card penetration under 5%, the demand for accessible digital credit was colossal. Operational costs were staggeringly low; a decent office in a major city could be rented for around ¥10,000 per month, and a monthly salary of ¥2,000 was considered competitive. Technologically, the barrier to entry was minimal—existing lending apps were simply translated into English and Hindi. Industry reports suggest over 100 Chinese-backed online lending platforms established operations in India within the first year of this exodus, setting the stage for a rapid and reckless expansion of Chinese online lending in India.

The Regulatory Vacuum and Profitability Projections

A pivotal attraction was India’s lack of a universal interest rate cap for non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) and digital lenders at the time. This regulatory gap allowed lenders to impose exorbitant rates that would be illegal in more mature markets. Cases documented in Indian media revealed loans with monthly interest rates ranging from 6.25% to an astonishing 25%, translating to annualized percentages between 75% and 300%. For operators squeezed in China, this represented an unparalleled profit opportunity. Conservative internal projections from some companies suggested monthly net profits could reach 10%, theoretically allowing capital to double in less than ten months. The frenzy for Chinese online lending in India was built on this arithmetic of high volume and even higher margins.

The Profit Illusion Shatters: Catastrophic Bad Debt Emerges

While the metrics for Chinese online lending in India looked promising on spreadsheets, the on-ground reality was a perfect storm of financial ruin. The very lack of financial literacy and formal credit history that made the market attractive also sowed the seeds of its collapse. Many borrowers, viewing unsecured digital loans as a form of windfall or “state subsidy,” engaged in brazen and widespread default. A common tactic was to download an app, secure a loan, immediately delete the application, and change phone numbers—effectively vanishing with the funds and leaving no trace for collectors.

Systemic Fraud and Organized “Loan Harvesting” Rings

The problem was systematically amplified by the emergence of organized loan fraud networks. Chinese intermediaries, leveraging experience from domestic markets, established online groups on platforms like WhatsApp to teach Indians how to systematically exploit multiple lending apps—a practice known as 撸口子 (lū kǒuzi). These groups even categorized platforms as “fat sheep” or “leeks” based on their perceived vulnerability and ease of exploitation. After extracting loans, groups would often collectively report the platforms to authorities, knowing the unlicensed or semi-licensed operators had little legal recourse. One platform operator, in an interview with local media, revealed that after two years of operation and disbursing ₹5 billion (approximately $60 million or ¥430 million) in loans, their bad debt rate had reached 47%, meaning nearly half the capital was lost. This was considered an industry average, with some platforms reporting rates as high as 80%. In stark contrast, bad debt rates for online lending in China typically range between a manageable 2% and 8%.

Operational Quagmire: Collection Nightmares and Cultural Divides

Efforts to recover debts in this environment proved largely futile, turning collection operations into a costly and often farcical endeavor. Standard tactics like call list bombing were ineffective against a population adept at navigating India’s profound linguistic diversity. A collector speaking English might be answered in Hindi; a switch to Hindi could be met with Tamil or Bengali. With 22 officially recognized languages, communication was a persistent and insurmountable barrier for centralized call centers. More brazen borrowers would retort to collectors, “Your credit limit is too low, can I borrow more?”

The Limits of Intimidation and a Tragic Catalyst

While threats and intimidation—hallmarks of some aggressive collection practices exported from China—were employed, they only proved effective on a minority of “respectable” borrowers concerned with social standing. For a significant segment of the population, these tactics held no power. The crisis reached a national inflection point in 2020 with the suicide of a well-known Indian sitcom writer, who was allegedly subjected to relentless harassment by debt collectors. This tragedy, widely covered in Indian media, ignited public outrage and became the catalyst for a sustained regulatory and law enforcement offensive against predatory lending. It starkly highlighted the human cost and operational risks embedded in the model of Chinese online lending in India.

Regulatory Reckoning: The Indian Crackdown Intensifies

The scale of Chinese online lending in India had become substantial by the early 2020s. According to data cited by Indian authorities, by the end of 2021, foreign lenders, predominantly Chinese, had facilitated an estimated 14 million transactions worth ₹210 billion (roughly $2.5 billion). In response, Indian regulators moved decisively. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) began issuing stricter guidelines and pressured tech giants like Google and Apple to remove non-compliant lending apps from their official stores. Law enforcement agencies, including the Enforcement Directorate, conducted raids on company offices, seizing assets worth billions of rupees and making numerous arrests. The crackdown targeted the entire ecosystem, not just lenders but also enablers such as individuals selling SIM cards to collection agencies and money laundering networks.

Evolving Rules and “Black-Eats-Black” Dynamics

The regulatory environment continued to tighten. India modified foreign direct investment (FDI) rules, requiring companies to have an Indian director on their board. Unscrupulous platforms would recruit local figurehead directors, only to have them discover the illegal operations and abscond with company funds. Since the lending was often unlicensed, borrowers felt even less obligation to repay, leading to a spiral of “black-eats-black” dynamics where all parties exploited the lack of legal oversight. After years of pressure, Google agreed in late 2024 to enforce the RBI’s digital lending guidelines strictly on its Play Store, with full implementation scheduled for January 2026 (RBI Circular on Digital Lending). This ongoing regulatory evolution has fundamentally altered the landscape for Chinese online lending in India.

The Aftermath and Broader Implications for Global Investors

Today, the landscape is barren compared to its peak. Most Chinese online lending platforms have exited India, and those that remain have shifted from “get-rich-quick” models to more measured, compliant, and partnership-based operations. However, earning sustainable profits remains a formidable challenge, compounded by India’s stringent capital controls that make repatriating earnings difficult—a phenomenon often summarized by the adage, “money earned in India isn’t easily taken out of India.”

The saga of Chinese online lending in India offers profound and cautionary lessons for global fintech investors, venture capitalists, and financial institutions eyeing high-growth emerging markets. It underscores that sheer market size and apparent structural gaps do not guarantee success. The venture demonstrated a fatal underestimation of local borrower behavior, overestimation of the efficacy of high-interest-rate models in a low-credit-culture environment, and a neglect of proactive regulatory engagement. The assumption that tactics successful in one market are directly transferrable proved dangerously flawed.

Moving Forward: A Blueprint for Risk-Aware Fintech Expansion

For institutional investors and fund managers considering exposure to cross-border fintech, especially in complex markets like India, Southeast Asia, or Africa, enhanced due diligence is non-negotiable. The failed chapter of Chinese online lending in India highlights several critical focus areas for future ventures:

1. Regulatory Landscape Analysis: Continuous and proactive monitoring of financial regulations is essential. Investors must ensure portfolio companies engage local legal experts early and often, and structure operations for full compliance from day one.
2. Cultural and Behavioral Risk Assessment: Understanding local borrowing mentalities, social norms around debt, and prevalent fraud trends is crucial. Partnerships with established local financial entities can provide invaluable ground-level insights and risk mitigation.
3. Technology and Data-Driven Solutions: Investment in advanced, alternative data-based credit scoring and robust, AI-powered fraud detection systems is mandatory to navigate markets with thin credit files.
4. Ethical and Sustainable Business Models: Building long-term trust through transparent, fair lending practices and reasonable rates is key to viability. Purely exploitative models inevitably face consumer backlash and regulatory annihilation.

The story of Chinese online lending in India is more than a tale of financial loss; it is a masterclass in the complexities of globalization in the digital finance age. For the sophisticated investor, it reinforces the timeless principle that in high-growth, high-risk markets, the greatest asset is not capital alone, but profound local knowledge, strategic patience, and an unwavering commitment to sustainable practices. As fintech continues to globalize, let this episode serve as a necessary checkpoint before deploying capital into the next frontier.

Eliza Wong

Eliza Wong

Eliza Wong fervently explores China’s ancient intellectual legacy as a cornerstone of global civilization, and has a fascination with China as a foundational wellspring of ideas that has shaped global civilization and the diverse Chinese communities of the diaspora.