After years of anticipation and swirling doubts, a landmark chapter in Shenzhen’s urban development has turned the page. The delivery of Greenview White Stone Zhou Phase One marks a critical milestone for one of China’s most watched and financially strained mega-projects. This event is far more than a routine handover of keys; it is a litmus test for the viability of complex urban renewal, the precarious state of some Chinese property developers, and the shifting expectations of high-net-worth homebuyers in a cooling market. The saga of the towers, soaring up to 74 stories, encapsulates the immense challenges and high-stakes gambles defining China’s property sector today.
Executive Summary: Key Takeaways
- Milestone Delivery: Greenview China Real Estate has formally initiated the delivery process for the first phase (Greenview White Stone Zhou Jingting) of the colossal White Stone Zhou urban renewal project in Nanshan, Shenzhen, following government approvals.
- Controversy and Buyer Discontent: The handover is clouded by significant disputes from homeowners over delayed delivery, unmet promises of elite school attachments, and perceived compromises on communal area quality, including underground parking.
- Developer Under Extreme Pressure: Greenview Group has heavily leveraged itself on this project. Its listed entity, Greenview China Real Estate, reported severe liquidity constraints with cash reserves critically low against substantial short-term debt.
- Future Phases in Limbo: Subsequent phases of the 3.58 million sqm GFA project may require restructuring and are likely dependent on attracting new capital, with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or local government financing vehicles seen as probable partners.
- Broader Market Implications: This delivery serves as a high-profile case study on the execution risks of ultra-large urban renewals, the evolving regulatory scrutiny on sales practices, and the critical need for financial stability in long-term development.
The Delivery Announcement: A Milestone Achieved
On the morning of February 4th, the long-awaited news finally hit the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Greenview China Real Estate announced that the main construction work for the first phase of its flagship urban renewal project in Shenzhen’s Nanshan District had been completed, with all relevant government acceptance procedures fulfilled. The company stated it had officially commenced the delivery, or “taking possession” (入伙), process for the residential units of Greenview White Stone Zhou Jingting. The board expressed confidence that the project’s market launch would enhance the group’s property portfolio in the Greater Bay Area and South China, positively impacting future business and financial performance.
Navigating the “Grace Period”
The announcement came after a period of intense buyer anxiety. According to sales contracts viewed by homeowners, the stipulated delivery date was January 15, 2026. However, in late January, project representatives clarified that due to the project’s massive scale and unique complexities, the contract explicitly included a one-month grace period. Deliveries before February 14th would not be considered a breach of contract—a clause homeowners had signed. This technical adherence to contract terms allowed the developer to avoid formal default penalties, but did little to assuage buyer frustrations that had been building for months over other, more significant issues.
Buyer Disputes: Promises Versus Reality
The delivery of Greenview White Stone Zhou Phase One has been overshadowed by vocal discontent from a segment of its homeowners. Purchasers, many of whom invested tens of millions of yuan, cite a gap between the ambitious promises made during sales and the current reality on the ground. Their concerns crystallize around two core issues: education配套 and construction quality.
The Elite School Attachment That Vanished
The most contentious point revolves around the promised school. “A vast number of us homeowners bought here precisely for this school,” said an agitated Mr. Wu, a homeowner representative. During sales, promotional materials prominently featured commitments to a “nine-year consistent education system” affiliated with the prestigious Nanshan Foreign Language School, with an estimated opening date of September 2026.
The current situation is starkly different. The land parcel for the school has reportedly not yet begun demolition, with information suggesting a construction start in 2027 and completion in 2029. “The land for the school isn’t even cleared. There’s no sign of work starting. This is truly unacceptable,” Mr. Wu stated.
In response, the project负责人 explained that while early plans involved the developer building the school, later adjustments in government fiscal planning transferred responsibility to the state. The land was handed over in 2025, and a general contractor was appointed by the government in October 2025. The developer asserts that all promotional material regarding the school was ceased by mid-2024 and that all publicized materials were reviewed and filed with the Market Supervision Administration.
Quality Concerns and the Underground Parking Debate
Beyond the school, the perceived quality of communal areas has sparked debate. A focal point has been the underground garage. Some homeowners visiting the site noted the absence of epoxy floor paint, which they argued fell short of expectations for a luxury development. After months of negotiation, the developer provided a stamped rendering of garage improvements.
The project负责人 framed this as an “additional enhancement beyond contractual delivery standards.” He stated that a garage upgrade plan was agreed upon with homeowners in April-May 2024 and that the developer is currently re-evaluating the方案 based on feedback from homeowner representatives. This distinction between contractual obligations and promotional “extras” lies at the heart of many disputes in China’s property market today.
Project Background: Shenzhen’s Urban Renewal Behemoth
To understand the magnitude of this delivery, one must grasp the scale of the White Stone Zhou (白石洲) project itself. Since its inclusion in Shenzhen’s urban renewal plan in 2014, it has been a focal point for the industry due to its staggering size—a total gross floor area (GFA) of 3.58 million square meters and an estimated total sales value of approximately 220 billion yuan.
A Decade-Long Endeavor
Greenview Group, a Shenzhen-based developer, bet its fortune on this project over a decade ago. The first phase, now being delivered, is positioned as a high-end residential and commercial complex in the city’s core. The Greenview White Stone Zhou Jingting residential component presold 1,257 units. Its most striking feature is the building height, with the tallest tower reaching 74 stories, making it one of the tallest residential projects under construction in China and a new icon on Shenzhen’s skyline.
The project obtained its pre-sale license in September 2023 with an average record-filing price of 113,500 yuan per square meter. Unit prices ranged from 10.12 million to 52.84 million yuan, squarely targeting the luxury segment. A report by National Business Daily (每日经济新闻) last September indicated that while the first phase was in a near-completion state, the developer’s financial woes fueled market rumors about a potential 12-billion-yuan bailout by a state-backed entity, which was subsequently denied.
Financial Precariousness and the Search for Partners
The delivery of Greenview White Stone Zhou Phase One occurs against a backdrop of severe financial strain for Greenview Group. The numbers from its listed platform, Greenview China Real Estate, paint a dire picture. According to its 2025 interim report, the company held cash and bank balances of only 3.425 billion yuan, against short-term borrowings due within one year of approximately 29.14 billion yuan. Total current liabilities stood at 60.57 billion yuan.
The Imperative for External Rescue
This liquidity crunch casts a long shadow over the future phases (II, III, IV) of the White Stone Zhou project. Industry sources suggest these phases may require redesign to comply with newer Shenzhen regulations and are contingent on introducing new capital partners. The consensus among analysts points towards state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Zhi Peiyuan (支培元), Vice President of the Listed Company Investment Professional Committee of China Investment Association, noted that SOEs or local government financing platforms have a higher probability of taking over such projects due to their lower capital costs and expertise in navigating complex government and business relations.
Lu Kelin (卢克林), International Certified Innovation Manager and founder of Looker Island Technology, was more blunt, stating that Shenzhen’s large-scale urban renewal “arena only recognizes two tickets: money and government credit背书.” He outlined four criteria for a rescuer: a war chest of tens of billions in cash;默契 in negotiating拆迁 compensation with district and street-level governments; the “product iteration capability” to make the economics work after recalculation; and the “financial deconstruction skills” to repackage the 220-billion-yuan asset into smaller, manageable tranches.
Implications for China’s Property and Urban Renewal Landscape
The saga of Greenview White Stone Zhou Phase One is not an isolated incident. It serves as a powerful microcosm of the broader challenges facing China’s property sector, particularly in the realm of complex, multi-phase urban regeneration.
A Test Case for Market Confidence
The successful—albeit contentious—delivery of this phase is a necessary first step in restoring some degree of confidence among potential buyers for future phases and creditors assessing the project’s overall viability. It demonstrates an ability to execute on core construction, albeit while highlighting severe shortcomings in communication and expectation management. The intense scrutiny from educated, high-value homeowners also signals a new era of buyer activism and heightened demands for transparency, which developers can no longer ignore.
Blueprint for Future Mega-Projects?
The likely path forward for White Stone Zhou—partnership with well-capitalized, state-backed entities—may become the standard model for completing other stalled mega-projects across China. It underscores a fundamental shift: the era where private developers could single-handedly finance and execute decade-long, city-scale renewals on highly leveraged balance sheets may be over. The future points toward hybrid models where private expertise in development and sales is coupled with the financial stability and government coordination strength of SOEs.
The delivery of these 74-story towers is a monumental engineering and logistical achievement. Yet, the concurrent financial distress and buyer disputes reveal the profound non-construction risks embedded in such undertakings. For international investors and market observers, the White Stone Zhou story reinforces critical lessons: the paramount importance of developer financial health in long-duration projects, the increasing regulatory and legal risks around sales practices and配套 promises, and the essential role of government and state capital as a backstop in stabilizing systemic urban development projects.
As the first homeowners move into Shenzhen’s newest residential landmarks, the industry’s attention now turns to whether Greenview and its potential future partners can navigate the even more treacherous path of financing and launching the next phases. The journey of Greenview White Stone Zhou Phase One from plan to possession offers a masterclass in the ambitions and perils of modern Chinese urbanism—a case study that will undoubtedly inform investment and development strategies for years to come. Stakeholders would be wise to monitor the resolution of ongoing buyer disputes and the progress on securing a financially sound partnership for the project’s future, as these will be the true indicators of its long-term success.