Eliza Wong
Once a prominent name in China’s electric vehicle race, WM Motor’s collapse in 2023 left suppliers unpaid, factories idle, and a debt pile of over $36 billion. Now, under new ownership by Baoneng Group’s subsidiary Shenzhen Xiangfei, the automaker has announced an audacious five-year plan targeting one million vehicles and $140 billion in revenue. But with both WM and Baoneng drowning in debt, and the EV market more competitive than ever, industry experts are questioning the viability of this ambitious revival.
On September 6, 2025, WM Motor released a ‘White Paper to Suppliers,’ outlining a three-phase strategy to return to production and eventually dominate the EV market. The plan starts with the resumption of manufacturing for the EX5 and E5 models, with a target of 10,000 units in the first year, scaling up to 100,000 by 2026. The most eye-catching goal, however, is the target of one million vehicles by 2030, a figure that would place WM among the top EV makers in China—if achieved.
The revival is structured in clear stages:
– Phase 1 (2025–2026): Restart production, achieve sales of 10,000–20,000 vehicles, and generate $1.4–2.8 billion in revenue.
– Phase 2 (2027–2028): Scale annual sales to 250,000–400,000 vehicles and begin preparations for an IPO.
– Phase 3 (2030): Produce one million vehicles annually with projected revenue of $140 billion.
The biggest question surrounding WM Motor’s revival is funding. The company’s confirmed debts stand at approximately $36 billion, while its total assets are valued at just $5.6 billion. Baoneng Group, which controls Shenzhen Xiangfei, is itself burdened with massive debt—executed claims against the group exceed $70 billion.
WM’s White Paper mentions an initial investment of $140 million for equipment upgrades, supply chain reactivation, and product development. However, industry analysts estimate that a full revival would require at least several billion dollars. For context:
– Leading EV makers like BYD invest over $75 billion annually in R&D alone.
– NIO, XPeng, and Li Auto each spend between $9–18 billion per year on innovation and expansion.
WM’s proposed funding seems grossly insufficient. Moreover, Shenzhen Xiangfei, the official new owner, has a registered capital of just $140 million and reportedly zero employees as of its 2024 filing—hardly the financial heavyweight needed to orchestrate a turnaround of this scale.
Baoneng Group, once a major player in real estate and automotive manufacturing, has seen its own fortunes decline in recent years. Its automotive subsidiary, Baoneng Auto, struggled with its own brand called Qoros, and now appears to be pinning its hopes on WM’s revival.
This is not Baoneng’s first attempt at automotive manufacturing. The company previously acquired Qoros Auto but failed to make it profitable despite heavy investment. Industry observers are skeptical that Baoneng has learned from past mistakes, especially given its ongoing financial and legal troubles.
The electric vehicle market in China is saturated, with over 129 brands competing for space. Price wars are constant, and gross margins for many manufacturers remain thin or negative. In 2024 alone, more than 220 models participated in price reductions, and nearly half of all models saw declines in both sales volume and pricing.
WM’s planned production restart relies on older models—the EX5 and E5—which are already technologically obsolete. Key drawbacks include:
– 400V electrical architecture, while rivals have moved to 800V systems for faster charging.
– Inferior battery thermal management, resulting in shorter range and poor cold-weather performance.
– Minimal upgrades in autonomous driving or smart cabin features.
Meanwhile, companies like BYD, Tesla, and Li Auto have consistently raised the bar in performance, efficiency, and user experience. Even with aggressive pricing, WM may struggle to convince customers to choose its vehicles over more advanced alternatives.
A critical part of WM’s revival depends on rebuilding relationships with suppliers. The company’s White Paper includes promises to settle small debts (under $2,100) within six months, while larger debts will be converted into trust equity—a proposal that offers little certainty of repayment.
Given WM’s history of broken promises and unpaid bills, many suppliers are likely to be cautious. Those who do agree to work with WM again may demand upfront payments or stricter terms, increasing the pressure on the company’s limited cash flow.
WM Motor’s plan is bold, but the challenges are immense. The company must not only secure sufficient funding but also innovate rapidly, regain market trust, and compete in the world’s most aggressive EV market. Few industry watchers are optimistic.
Zhang Xiang, Secretary-General of the International Association of Intelligent Transportation Systems, noted: ‘WM’s products were known for affordability, but the low-price strategy is no longer enough. Without strong technology and brand appeal, it’s hard to see how they can make a comeback.’
Other analysts point out that WM’s three-year hiatus has left it far behind in areas like autonomous driving, connectivity, and energy efficiency. Catching up would require billions in R&D—funds that WM simply doesn’t have.
WM Motor’s attempt to return from collapse is one of the most ambitious—some would say unrealistic—revival plans in the automotive industry’s recent history. With inadequate funding, outdated products, and a deeply skeptical supply chain, the company faces steep odds. Yet, the story is being closely watched as a test case for whether a bankrupt EV maker can rise again under new ownership. For now, the most likely outcome appears to be a slow fade rather than a miraculous recovery. Industry stakeholders and observers would be wise to monitor WM’s progress with caution.
